

*Repts 6*  
37110-11824

Executive Registry

73-7180/

21 November 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: DCI Contact with JCS

REFERENCE: OSR Memorandum, Subject: PFIAB, the Navy, Et Al,  
20 November 1973 (attached)

1. There is an important point in Paragraph 4.e. of reference memorandum. There is a level of "shakers and movers" in the strategic field with which you have inadequate contact. This includes the JCS and the politico-military element of State in the person of Sy Weiss. There are a number of foreign policy-related decisions heavily affected by this combination. Perhaps more importantly, attitudes are formed about the substance of intelligence issues which have considerable impact on you and the intelligence community as a whole. I think it would be of considerable value to have you meet with this aggregation, say once a month, to discuss specific but broad strategic matters. Topics which spring to mind are: strategic impact of the energy situation; the prospects for further improvement in the Soviet Navy; and the problem of coordinating substantive intelligence estimates with NATO.

2. As soon as we get Admiral Harvey aboard I will assign him the task of exploring arrangements which might be made for such an exchange of views. I would not contemplate another formal "committee."

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Major General, USA  
D/DCI/IC

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20 November 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : PFIAB, the Navy, Et Al

1. I attended a meeting of a special panel of PFIAB today to discuss various matters of naval interest. The special panel, chaired by Admiral Anderson (and including Gordon Gray, Bob Galvan and Wheaton Byers), has been looking into "the navy problem." The stimulus is the President's statement to Admiral Anderson on 4 October that he wants to insure that the US navy is "second to none."

2. This was the third of the panel's intensive sessions to date. DIA and NSA were also represented at today's meeting, topic of which was Naval Command and Control--Ours and Theirs. Essentially, though, the sessions have been navy shows with little input from others.

3. Admiral Zumwalt attended part of the session today. One of the senior attendees was VAdm Jerry King, J-3 of JCS. Admirals Rectanus and Harlfinger were among the briefers.

4. Among matters raised were several of interest to you:

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b. In this, and in the ensuing conversation the naval participants seemed agreed that the Arab attack was a "strategic deception," apparently fomented by the Soviets as a kind of master plan. There were also comments about the intelligence community's penchant for mis-estimating in crisis times. Gordon Gray cited the problem of "subjective judgements in crisis times" as the biggest we have. Admiral King agreed, saying that strategic warning is an acute problem and operators have concluded they cannot rely on receiving it.

c. Admiral Zumwalt was critical of the pattern of annual estimates of force levels. He claimed that hindsight studies showed that the community historically underestimated them. He added that intelligence forecasting of technical advances was particularly weak.


d. The PFIAB panel was intrigued by description of Soviet leader participation in defense exercises as a means of practicing command and control. Admiral Anderson asked about US experience in this regard and was told that it has been traditionally impossible to get National Command Authority (i.e., the President and SecDef) participation in exercises--and even if it were, said King, the mere movement of our leaders in time of crisis to a mobile command post would provoke an enemy and scare our people.

e. In this context, Anderson asked how often DCIs have met with the JCS. He said he thought it most important you do so regularly. King said you have postponed some scheduled meetings in which the JCS have wanted to brief you on "certain strategic matters."

f. Anderson said at one point that he knew there was general agreement over the "weaknesses" of the Board of National Estimates and that NIO's, "under George Carver," were to replace the board.

↑  
In case you try to read what is written next to sub-  
para (e), it says "DCI briefing on SIOP scrubbed by  
him and never rescheduled." I understand it was  
written by Dr. Martin. As I mentioned to you, the  
SIOP briefing was scrubbed at JCS request on 25  
October, and they said they'd be back in touch. They  
were, on Friday, 2 November, at which time it was  
tentatively set for 28 November; I confirmed that time  
with JCS on Monday, 5 November.

He referred to the practice of having "mature, professional" military men and diplomats on the board and wondered if the new system might be lacking in something. No specific answer was given, several of us noting that the NIO system is just beginning and describing your hopes and expectations in this regard. Anderson seems particularly concerned about applying "mature, professional" knowledge in times of crisis.



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E. H. KNOCHE  
Director  
Strategic Research

cc: DDCI  
D/DCI/NIO  
D/DCI/IC  
DDI